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NOTE
PLEADING WITH CONGRESS To RESIST THE URGE
TO OVERRULE TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
Michael R. Huston*
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Su-
preme Court changed the rhetoric of the federal pleading system.
Those decisions have been decried by members of the bar, scholars,
and legislators as judicial activism and a rewriting of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such criticism has led members of both
houses of Congress to introduce legislation to overrule the deci-
sions and return to some variation of the "notice pleading" regime
that existed before Twombly. This Note argues that both of the cur-
rent proposals to overrule Twombly and Iqbal should be rejected.
Although the bills take different approaches to their goal of overrul-
ing Twombly and Iqbal, each one would disrupt the careful balance
of interests created by the Federal Rules and create intolerable con-
fusion for judges ruling on the often-filed 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Especially because the long-term effects of Twombly and
Iqbal on federal pleading remain unclear Congress should avoid a
rush to judgment on this important issue.
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INTRODUCTION
During the confirmation hearings of John G. Roberts, Jr. to become
Chief Justice of the United States in 2005, then-Judge Roberts famously
remarked, "Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they ap-
ply them."' But in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,' some have accused the
Chief Justice and a majority of the Court of remaking the rules of the federal
courts-the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Federal Rules").
Iqbal has been called "the most significant Supreme Court decision in a
decade for day-to-day litigation in the federal courts."4 In that case, the
plaintiff's original cause of action alleged intentional racial discrimination,
but by the time the case reached the Supreme Court it turned instead on a
question of procedure: what standard governs a motion in federal court to
dismiss a pleading for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)?
Rule 8(a)(2), which has governed the sufficiency of federal pleadings
since the adoption of the Federal Rules, requires only that the claimant pro-
vide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John
G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee).
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
4. Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2009, at Al0 (quoting Thomas C. Goldstein).
5. This motion, typically filed before a defendant's first responsive pleading, amounts to an
assertion by the defendant that even if all the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true, those facts would
nevertheless not subject the defendant to legal liability.
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entitled to relief."'6 From 1957 to 2006, the Supreme Court interpreted this
rule in a plaintiff-friendly manner, highlighted by the landmark decision in
Conley v. Gibson,' which stated that a motion to dismiss should be denied
unless the reviewing court can discern "no set of facts" that would entitle the
claimant to relief. Conley came to be synonymous with "notice pleading,"
the view that the primary-or perhaps even sole-function of a complaint is
to put a defendant on notice of the plaintiff's allegations so that the defen-
dant can begin to prepare a defense. In Twombly, however, the Court
announced that Conley's famous "no set of facts" language had "earned its
retirement."' Although the Court explicitly affirmed the validity of Rule
8(a)(2) as written and claimed no drastic change to the standard,9 the Court
interpreted the rule to require that a claimant include enough facts in his
complaint to state a claim to relief that is "plausible on its face."'0
Two years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Twombly standard" in
Iqbal and laid out the analytical framework, or "working principles," that
federal courts now use to evaluate the sufficiency of pleadings.12 Iqbal's
working principles direct the reviewing court to separate the complaint's
"legal conclusions" and "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action," neither of which are entitled to be presumed true, from its well-pled
facts, which the court must presume to be true at the pleading stage." The
court must then determine whether the well-pled facts alone, taken as true,
state a "plausible claim for relief." 4
Reaction to Iqbal in the academic community and from the plaintiffs'
bar was overwhelmingly fierce and negative. Scholars and practitioners
called it a "grave disappointment," a "really bad opinion," and "an excuse to
throw out suits on the pleadings."" Professor Stephen Burbank testified be-
fore Congress that "Twombly and Iqbal may contribute to the phenomenon
of vanishing trials, the degradation of the Seventh Amendment right to a
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
7. 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).
8. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
9. Id. at 569 n.14.
10. Id. at 570. Critics of Twombly marked the decision as a drastic change from the "notice
pleading" of Conley to a system of "plausibility pleading." They predicted that the decision would
result in a significant increase in the number of plaintiffs who see their claims dismissed at the
pleading stage. E.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431-33
(2008).
11. Because Twombly was decided in an antitrust case where the substantive law of what
constitutes a plausible claim was already established, some commentators wondered whether
Twombly would apply outside of an antitrust setting. E.g., Anthony Martinez, Case Note, Plausibil-
ity Among the Circuits: An Empirical Survey of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 ARK. L. REV.
763, 770-71 (2009).
12. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
13. Id. at 1949-50.
14. Id. at 1950.
15. David G. Savage, Narmwing the courthouse door: High court makes it tougher to get
past the pleading stage, A.B.A. J., July 2009, at 22, 22-23.
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jury trial, and the emasculation of private civil litigation as a means of en-
forcing public law."16 This criticism was based in part on the fear that Iqbal
will result in a significant increase in the number of cases dismissed in fed-
eral court before plaintiffs have an opportunity to develop their claims
through the discovery process. The decision has even been described as
creating an "insurmountable barrier to access" to the courts for certain
plaintiffs.' 8 In 2009, animosity toward the Court's recent pleading decisions
led to the introduction of bills in both houses of Congress to overrule
Twombly and Iqbal and mandate a return to the "notice pleading" standard
of Conley.'9 As of mid-2010, both of these bills have been referred to their
respective chambers' judiciary committees and reviewed in hearings.
This Note argues that Congress should reject the urge to overrule
Twombly and Iqbal because such legislation would distort the careful bal-
ance of interests developed by the Federal Rules. Part I reviews the Supreme
Court's Rule 8(a)(2) pleading jurisprudence from Conley to Twombly and
Iqbal, as well as Congress's reaction to those decisions. Part H considers re-
cent federal decisions that have applied the Iqbal working principles to Rule
12(b)(6) motions and concludes that the decision has not dramatically in-
creased the number of cases dismissed in federal court. Finally, Part III
argues that Congress should reject legislation that would overrule Twombly
and Iqbal. Such legislation would either inject unacceptable confusion into
federal pleading practice or would implement an unworkable standard that
unfairly burdens defendants before any wrongdoing has been plausibly al-
leged.
I. FROM NOTICE PLEADING TO PLAUSIBILITY
PLEADING (AND BACK AGAIN?)
A. Conley and the Legacy of Notice Pleading
Notice pleading's most important expression came in the Supreme
Court's 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson.2 0 The Conley complaint alleged
16. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans' Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Stephen
B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania).
17. Federal Court Pleading Restoration: Hearing on H.R. 4115 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., at *8 (2009) [here-
inafter December House Hearing] (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Member, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (LEXIS); see also Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIG.,
Spring 2009, at 2 ("Iqbal has the potential to short-circuit the adversary process by shutting the
doors of federal courthouses around the nation to large numbers of legitimate claims based on what
amounts to a district court judge's effectively irrefutable, subjective assessment of probable suc-
cess.").
18. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 28
(2009).
19. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open Access to
Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
20. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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illegal race discrimination in union practices and the defendants moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.2 The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the com-
plaint in the lower courts, holding that the complaint was sufficient under
Rule 8(a)(2) and stating that when reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) motions, "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it ap-
pears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief., 22
Conley's interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) was liberal by design.23 It re
flected the Court's understanding that the Federal Rules seek to provide a
plaintiff with an opportunity to pursue his claims even when he cannot
prove them at the pleading stage.24 In this respect, the Conley standard was
largely successful: the vast majority of motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim were denied in federal court.25 Along with generous discovery rules
that permit a plaintiff to obtain all nonprivileged information in the defen-
dant's possession relevant to the claim,26 Conley's interpretation of Rule
8(a)(2) sought to provide the plaintiff with the best possible opportunity to
develop his facts and prove his case at trial.
21. The plaintiffs in Conley were African American members of a railway workers union
who sued the union for failing to represent their interests to their employer in good faith, as the
union had done for its white members. Id. The union was required to represent the plaintiffs equally
under the Railway Labor Act. Id. at 42-43. In the lower federal courts, the complaint was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the act conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the National
Railroad Adjustment Board. Id. at 43. The Supreme Court reversed that finding, id. at 44, and then
proceeded to address the sufficiency of the complaint.
22. Id. at 45-48. Although this language made Conley famous, it was dictum. The Conley
complaint was held to be sufficient because, if all of the alleged facts were proved, a violation of the
statute would necessarily be shown. Thus, the complaint would have survived under a much stricter
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2), possibly including the working principles of Iqbal. See Richard L.
Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 433, 434 (1986).
23. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(3) (requiring that "the factual contentions [in a pleading] have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a rea-
sonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery"). Plaintiffs in many types of actions may
be confident they have been wronged but unable to explain how defendant acted contrary to the law
without accessing information in the defendant's possession. See Liptak, supra note 4 (identifying
employment discrimination, products liability, antitrust violations, and harsh detention treatment as
possible examples). Importantly, however, the class of plaintiffs who lack sufficient factual matter at
the pleading stage to plead their claim with plausibility is much smaller.
25. 5B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1357, at 565 (3d ed. 2004); Rothman, supra note 17, at 1. But see Patricia W. Hatamyar, The
Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 553, 598-99
(2010) (concluding that approximately 40 percent of Rule 12(b)(6) motions were dismissed without
leave to amend between 2005 and 2007, the two years immediately preceding Twombly, and noting
surprise at these findings).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Interestingly, although American discovery is usually under-
stood to favor plaintiffs, Conley interpreted the discovery rules as a limiting mechanism on the
pleading standard. 355 U.S. at 47-48. The Court viewed discovery as a means of forcing the plain-
tiff to disclose the basis of his claim more precisely and to define the disputed facts more narrowly
than he did at the pleading stage. Id.
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Although Conley's "no set of facts" interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) be-
came the standard citation for federal courts ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions, that interpretation was severely criticized. Some believed that the
standard unduly favored plaintiffs and would allow too many frivolous
claims to proceed, thereby forcing defendants to undertake huge discovery
expenses shortly after an action was filed.27 This in turn was said to create
massive settlement leverage for plaintiffss and encourage them to bring
suits with little or no merit. Such concerns led Congress to pass the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,9 designed to prevent plaintiffs
from manipulating the liberal pleading system to achieve settlement lever-
age through discovery in securities cases-cases which Congress believed
were particularly vulnerable to abuse.o Eventually, these same concerns
contributed to the Supreme Court's repudiation of the Conley standard alto-
gether.
B. Twombly and the Rise of Plausibility
Conley's vision of notice pleading maintained its position as the stan-
dard interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) for five decades. Then in 2007, the
Supreme Court cast considerable doubt on the future of notice pleading with
its decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly." In Twombly, the plaintiffs
were subscribers to communications services who alleged that the defen-
dants, a group of telephone and internet service providers, violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act. 2 The complaint alleged that the defendants "engaged in
parallel conduct" in an effort to prevent new competitors from entering the
market and asked the court to infer an illegal conspiracy from the "absence
of any meaningful competition between the [defendants] in one another's
markets.""
Justice Souter, writing for a majority of seven, first held that merely al-
leging parallel conduct is insufficient to establish the "contract,
combination, or conspiracy" prohibited by the Sherman Act. Although par-
allel business behavior is "admissible circumstantial evidence from which
27. Rothman, supra note 17, at 1.
28. Liptak, supra note 4. For example, a corporate defendant facing allegations of an
elaborate illegal scheme may find it more economical to settle even a meritless case and avoid
discovery costs than to incur litigation costs and still risk an unfavorable judgment.
29. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
30. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)); H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.);
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.13[1][A], § 12.15[l] (6th ed.
2009).
31. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
32. Id. at 550.
33. Id. at 550-51.
34. Id. at 554 (quoting 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
T 1433(a), at 236 (2d ed. 2003)).
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the fact finder may infer agreement,"- such behavior is also just as consis-
tent with a "wide swath" of rational, competitive, and legal business
strategy. Because the allegations in the complaint were just as consistent
with legal, competitive behavior as with illegal, anticompetitive behavior,1
nothing in the complaint "nudged [the] claims across the line from conceiv-
able to plausible." 8 The complaint thus failed to show that the pleader is
entitled to relief, as required by Rule 8(a)(2).
The Court held that a complaint with mere "labels and conclusions," or a
"formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" is not sufficient to
comply with Rule 8(a)(2).9 Further, the rule that factual allegations in a
complaint are to be presumed true does not apply to a "legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation."40 Justice Souter rejected the notion that this
imposes a demanding standard on plaintiffs, stating that Rule 8(a)(2) does
not require "detailed factual allegations" 4' and "does not impose a probabil-
ity requirement at the pleading stage."42 Instead, the rule's instruction that
the complaint "possess enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief' "43 merely requires that the complaint contain enough facts "to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [behav-
ior] ."4 When, as in Twombly, a defendant's alleged conduct is consistent
with both legal and illegal behavior, Rule 8(a)(2) requires that the complaint
plausibly suggest that the charged illegal behavior occurred.45
The Court then engaged in a full-scale repudiation of Conley's interpre-
tation of Rule 8(a)(2).4 It treated Conley as establishing the "breadth of
opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims," rather than what
constitutes a baseline of sufficiency for a federal pleading.47 That is, once "a
complaint adequately states a claim"-but not before-"it may not [then] be
dismissed based on a district court's assessment that the plaintiff will fail to
find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfac-
tion of the factfinder" 48 The Court explained that although Conley's "no set
35. Id. at 553 (quoting Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
540 (1954)).
36. Id. at 554.
37. Id. at 566. But see id. at 589-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the complaint
alleged direct agreement among the defendants, not merely parallel behavior).
38. Id. at 570 (majority opinion).
39. Id. at 555.
40. Id. (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 556.
43. Id. at 557 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 556.
45. Id. at 557.
46. Id. at 561-63.
47. Id. at 563.
48. Id. at 564 n.8 (emphasis added).
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of facts" language was cited with regularity, the literal application of such a
standard was never actually the norm, in theory or in practice, for federal
courts evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) motions.4 Then came the death blow: the
majority stated that the "puzzling," "no set of facts" rule is "best forgotten as
an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.",o In its
place, Justice Souter announced the Court's new interpretation of Rule
8(a)(2): "heightened fact pleading of specifics" is not required, "only
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.""
C. Iqbal and the New Analytical Framework
In 2009, the Supreme Court clarified and implemented the new interpre-
tation of Rule 8(a)(2) announced in Twombly." Most importantly, the
decision worked through the specific analytical framework, or "working
principles," that federal courts are to utilize when considering a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Iqbal also removed any ambiguity that
existed concerning the applicability of the plausibility analysis to all Rule
12(b)(6) motions."
The plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, was a Pakistani national who was arrested
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and detained by federal
officials on charges of identity fraud." Lqbal's complaint alleged that Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller designated
him-one of thousands of Arab Muslim men detained during the September
11th investigation-as a person of "high interest" solely "on account of his
race, religion, or national origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution."" Iqbal alleged that both defendants
"'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject' [him]
to harsh conditions of confinement until he was 'cleared' by the FBI 'as a
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest.' ,6 The complaint identi-
fied Ashcroft as the "principal architect" of the policy and identified Mueller
as "instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation.""
The district court denied the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss, citing Conley.5 The Second Circuit affirmed, interpreting Twombly to
49. Id. at 561-63. The Court cited a series of cases and scholarship repudiating Conley as
excessively lenient and unworkable in practice. For more, see infra Section H.A.
50. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63.
51. Id. at 570.
52. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
53. See supra note 11.
54. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942-43.
55. Id. at 1944.
56. Id. (second alteration in original).
57. Id. (alteration in original).
58. Id.
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hold that a court need only consider a complaint's plausibility when the
claim is unusually complex, such as an alleged antitrust violation. 9 The Su-
preme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court rejected
the Second Circuit's reading of Twombly and instead evaluated the com-
plaint in light of what Iqbal's cause of action would require him to prove.
Because Iqbal's claim required him to prove that the defendants adopted
their detention policy with the deliberate intent to discriminate against him
on account of his race, religion, or national origin, rather than for a neutral
investigative purpose, Rule 8(a)(2) required Iqbal to plead sufficient facts
61to plausibly show intentional discrimination.
The Court then explained the two "working principles" of Twombly.62
First, facts will be presumed true at the pleading stage, but "legal conclu-
sions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements," will not.63 The reviewing court
must first separate those facts that are presumed true from the "conclusory"
allegations that are not." Second, looking only to those facts that are pre-
sumed true, the court must "draw on its judicial experience and common
sense" in order to engage in the "context-specific task" of determining
whether the complaint "states a plausible claim for relief."s Both Twombly
and Iqbal show that plaintiffs should take particular care to address the plau-
sibility of their claims when the alleged behavior, despite being consistent
with illegal conduct, is nevertheless more likely explained by a lawful pur-
pose." Where the plaintiff's facts do not allow the reviewing court to infer
more than "the mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint will not meet
Rule 8(a)(2)'s requirement that the plaintiff "show" he is entitled to relief.67
Applying these two principles, the Court first identified and set aside
Iqbal's conclusory allegations. For instance, Iqbal's claim that the defen-
dants "willfully and maliciously" subjected him to harsh confinement
"solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin,"
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1948-49. Iqbal's substantive burden of proof was governed by the Supreme Court's
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), in which the Court held that the Constitution implies a right of private plaintiffs to sue fed-
eral officials for actions taken in their official capacity for harm resulting from the officials'
deprivations of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
61. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1950.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1951 (alteration in original). The Court also identified as conclusory allegations
Iqbal's claims that Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of the detention policy and that Mueller
was "instrumental" in its execution. Id.
423December 2010]
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"amount[ed] to nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of
a constitutional discrimination claim," and was not presumed true.69
The remainder of Iqbal's facts were presumed true, including that fed-
eral authorities, acting under Mueller's direction, arrested thousands of Arab
Muslim men following the September 11th attacks and that both defendants
approved the policy of holding these detainees in highly restrictive confine-
ment until they were cleared by the FBI.70 However, despite these policies
being consistent with intentional discrimination, the Court found that the
conduct was more likely explained by a legal, nondiscriminatory purpose to
securely detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States and
who had a potential connection to the September 11th attacks.' Since Arab
Muslims perpetrated those attacks, the investigation's disparate impact on
Arab Muslim men did not provide independent evidence of discriminatory
purpose. Ultimately, because Iqbal's complaint lacked any content that
"plausibly suggest[ed] [defendants'] discriminatory state of mind" and the
behaviors alleged were more likely explained by a lawful intention than an
unlawful one, Iqbal could not nudge his claims "across the line from con-
ceivable to plausible."
The final portion of the opinion rejected three proposed limitations on
Twombly." First, Twonbly's plausibility analysis is part of Rule 8(a)(2) and
applies to all cases filed in federal court, not just those alleging antitrust
conspiracy. Second, plausibility must be considered even in cases where
careful case management might be used to minimize the burden of discov-
ery on a defendant." Finally, "conclusory" allegations of intent are not made
sufficient by Rule 9(b), which allows intent to be "alleged generally."77 That
rule does not relax the pleading standard below Rule 8(a)(2)'s required
minimum for any allegation besides fraud or mistake.
Beyond merely affirming Twombly, the Iqbal opinion makes its own
contribution to pleading doctrine by its absence of any language supporting
the rhetoric of notice pleading. Despite retiring Conley, Twombly denied that
plausibility amounted to a "heightened" pleading standard and reaffirmed
the Court's prior refusals to adopt a stricter standard in cases that create
69. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1951.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1951-52 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
74. Id. at 1952.
75. Id. at 1953.
76. Id. at 1953-54 (holding that if the plaintiff's complaint does not meet the pleading stan-
dard of Rule 8(a)(2), including plausibility, then "he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or
otherwise").
77. Id. at 1954.
78. Id.
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concerns about litigation abuse. 9 No such language in support of notice
pleading appears in Iqbal.o And while prior cases approving notice pleading
may not be overruled, they are certainly made irrelevant by Iqbal's require-
ment that the two working principles be applied to every Rule 12(b)(6)
motion."' After Iqbal, plausibility pleading appears to be here to stay.
D. Congress Reacts
1. The Senate: Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009
Senator Arlen Specter was the first member of Congress to introduce
legislation taking aim at Twombly and Iqbal. On July 24, 2009, Specter in-
troduced Senate Bill 1504, the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009.
The bill states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect af-
ter the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a
complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, except under the standards set forth by the Su Preme Court of the
United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
When introducing the bill, Specter claimed that the Federal Rules only
require a complaint to put the defendant on notice of the substance of the
plaintiff's claims." Senator Leahy agreed during a hearing on the bill, stat-
ing that notice pleading reflects the intent of the Federal Rules and referring
to the plausibility analysis as a "judge-made rule[]."5 Various senators
claimed that the Conley standard was applied "consistently and faithfully" in
the federal courts until 20076 and that Twombly and Iqbal represent a sig-
nificant departure from that precedent. Senators also expressed concern
that Twombly and Iqbal "grant[] too much discretion to trial judges"88 and
allow them to indulge in subjective judgments when evaluating a
79. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-570 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)).
80. Hatamyar, supra note 25, at 556 ("Iqbal . . . contains not even a passing reference to
notice pleading . . . ").
81. Cf Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that Iqbal
overruled Swierkiewicz).
82. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111 th Cong. (2009).
83. Id. § 2.
84. 155 CONG. REc. S7890 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter).
85. Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 3 (statement of Sen. Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary
Comm.).
86. 155 CONG. REc. S7891 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter).
87. Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 172 (statement of Sen. Feingold, Member, S. Judiciary
Comm.).
88. Id.
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complaint's plausibility." Finally, several senators disapprovingly stated that
the Supreme Court used Twombly and Iqbal to "effectively end [run)"" the
process for amending the Federal Rules envisioned by the Rules Enabling
Act."
The senators' comments are notable for two reasons. First, they show
that many senators understand "notice pleading" to be a commandment of
Rule 8(a)(2) itself rather than a description of doctrine derived from
Conley's interpretation of that rule. Second, despite the senators' comments,
and as will be shown in Section II.A, the federal courts' treatment of Conley
was neither faithful to nor consistent with a straightforward reading of the
opinion's "no set of facts" overstatement.
2. The House of Representatives: Open Access to Courts Act of 2009
The introduction of Senate Bill 1504 gave members of the House of
Representatives time to develop their own preferred legislative response to
Iqbal, one which includes subtle but critical differences from the Senate bill.
On November 19, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler introduced H.R.
4115, the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009.92 The bill states:
A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a com-
plaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination by
the judge that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the plain-
tiff's claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.93
Statements in support of House Bill 4115 were similar to the comments
in the Senate. Representative Nadler stated that Iqbal will "slam shut the
courthouse door on legitimate plaintiffs" based on a trial judge's "subjective
89. 155 CONG. REc. S7891 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter).
90. Id.; see also Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 173 (statement of Sen. Feingold, Member,
S. Judiciary Comm.).
91. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (2006). The Enabling Act states that "[tihe Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases
in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
courts of appeals." Id. § 2072. However, the act also envisions that proposed rules shall be devel-
oped with the aid and consideration of the Judicial Conference of the United States and various
committees consisting of "members of the bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate
judges,' and shall be accompanied by "an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report explain-
ing the body's action, including any minority or separate views." Id. § 2073. The Supreme Court is
to transmit proposed Federal Rules to Congress no later than May 1st of any year in which the rule
is to become active, and that proposed rule will take effect on December Ist of the same year unless
Congress "otherwise provide[s] by law." Id. § 2074.
92. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
93. Id. § 2078(a).
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take on the plausibility of a claim rather than [] on the actual evidence."9 He
stated that House Bill 4115 is intended to "restore the standard followed for
the last 50 years since ... Conley,"9 ' a standard that he referred to as "cor-
rect," "well understood," "practical," and "workable . .. for a half-century."9
Supporters of House Bill 4115 characterized Iqbal as a "heightened plead-
ing standard"97 that amounts to an amendment to the Federal Rules. 8 These
representatives joined many of their Senate colleagues in decrying Iqbal as a
"bypass,"9 or "judicial usurpation,"'" of the Rules Enabling Act.
Although the two bills were derived from similar motivations, they dif-
fer in the degree of specificity with which they seek to reverse Twombly and
Iqbal. While Senate Bill 1504 only refers generically to the "standards set
forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson,"'o'
House Bill 4115 is intentionally more specific and mandates that the most
liberal language in Conley, the "no set of facts" rule, be elevated from a
mere "gloss" on Rule 8(a)(2)"2 to the substantive pleading standard itself.'o3
In the next Part, this Note explains why both of these bills would produce
unacceptable results and should be rejected.
II. BUSINESS AS USUAL: RULE 8(A)(2) IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS AFTER IQBAL
A review of the cases to date applying the Twombly and Iqbal pleading
standards suggests that those decisions have not dramatically increased the
number of cases dismissed in federal court for failure to state a claim. In
Twombly, the Court hypothesized that the decision would have a limited
effect on federal pleading practice because the plausibility analysis is con-
sistent with a straightforward reading of Rule 8(a)(2) and decades of settled
94. December House Hearing, supra note 17, at *8 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Mem-
ber, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
95. Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2009)
[hereinafter October House Hearing] (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties).
96. December House Hearing, supra note 17, at *9 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Mem-
ber, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
97. Id.
98. October House Hearing, supra note 95, at 4 (statement of Rep. Hank Johnson, Member,
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Nadler).
101. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
102. Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) (referring to the Conley language
as an "incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard").
103. October House Hearing, supra note 95, at 94 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Chair-
man, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties)
(suggesting that Congress should respond to Iqbal through legislation "specifying [the standard] so
the courts know what we mean and can't interpret it differently").
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precedent.'4 At least thus far, the Twombly majority has been vindicated in
that prediction.
A. The Strict Language of Conley Has Never Actually Been Used
as a Pleading Standard in Federal Court
Although Justice Stevens's dissent in Twombly called the majority's de-
cision a "dramatic departure from settled procedural law,"'o scholarship
examining Conley shows conclusively that, long before Twombly, pure no-
tice pleading was much more of a "myth"'" than a "consistently and
faithfully implemented"'" doctrine. The Twombly Court noted that Conley's
terms were never interpreted literally and cited a handful of cases and arti-
cles showing that judges in practice had long since rejected Conley's broad
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2).'08
The fact that federal courts never applied Conley literally is not surpris-
ing. The actual language of the rule is essentially broad beyond limitation:
How will it ever "appear[] beyond doubt" that a plaintiff can "prove no set
of facts entitling him to relief?"'" Even if one reads Conley to mean that
Rule 8(a)(2) only requires the plaintiff to identify a valid legal theory and
provide the defendant with notice of his claims, federal courts in practice
have never understood the rule to do so little."o Professor Charles Clark,
who has been called the "principal architect" of the "liberal ethos" of the
Federal Rules,"' described the Conley standard as "something like the
104. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63. The Court stated that rejecting the literal reading of
Conley "comports with this Court's statements in the years since Conley." Id. at 563 n.8.
105. Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 987 (2003); see
also Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in
Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935 (1990); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened
Pleading, 81 Tx. L. REv. 551 (2002); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading
Practice, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1749 (1998); Marcus, supra note 22; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 299 (1989).
107. 111 CONG. REc. S7891 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter).
108. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 (citing, inter alia, Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) ("In practice, a complaint ... must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some
viable legal theory.")); see also Marcus, supra note 22, at 460-65 (examining cases that "[strained]
the outer limit of pleading practice [under Conley]" by dismissing cases at the pleading stage, either
where the complaint was missing facts to support a critical element of the claim or where the totality
of the plaintiff's allegations led the court to "sensibly decide" that the defendant did not violate the
law).
109. Marcus, supra note 22, at 433-34.
110. See Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the
Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. lqbal, 95 MINN. L. REv.
505, 530-31 (2009) (stating that the sufficiency of a complaint has never turned on the sufficiency
of notice alone and that courts have always required plaintiffs to provide enough facts to both give
notice and show legal merit).
111. Marcus, supra note 22, at 433.
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Golden Rule, which is a nice hopeful thing; but ... isn't anything that we
can use with any precision."" 2
Conley's imprecision in pleading jurisprudence can be seen at least as
far back as the 1970s."' In Warth v. Seldin,"4 the Supreme Court dismissed
the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing after finding that the plaintiffs'
allegations were not supported by "specific, concrete facts" showing harm.' 5
Notably, the Court characterized the plaintiffs' standing claim as "conclu-
sory,""'6 the same disapproving terminology used to reject various
allegations in Twombly and Iqbal."' In Associated General Contractors, Inc.
v. California State Council of Carpenters,"'8 the Court reversed dismissal of
the plaintiff's antitrust action but directed the district court to require that
the plaintiff plead with particularity, stating that "in a case of this magni-
tude, a district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in
pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to pro-
ceed."" 9 In Papasan v. Allain,'20 the Court affirmed dismissal of a plaintiff's
civil rights complaint and held that although a court must treat factual alle-
gations as true, it is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation." 2 1 In Crawford-El v. Britton,122 the Court held that a
district judge may use a "firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure" at the pleading stage in order to prevent overly burdensome
discovery on public officials and "may insist that the plaintiff put forward
specific, nonconclusory factual allegations" that establish illegal conduct.123
Lower courts adhered to these Supreme Court decisions and developed
for themselves a pleading practice that is reasonably consistent with the
working principles of Iqbal.124 Circuit courts consistently rejected pleading
112. Charles Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. L.J. 177, 181 (1958) (omis-
sion in original).
113. Marcus, supra note 22, at 446.
114. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
115. Id. at 508. The plaintiffs in Warth were various residents of Penfield, New York who sued
the town and members of the town's zoning board alleging that the town's zoning ordinance effec-
tively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town. The plaintiffs'
complaint was dismissed for failure to show an actionable causal relationship between the town's
zoning practices and the alleged injury.
116. Id. at 503.
117. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007).
118. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
119. Id. at 528 n.17.
120. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
121. Id. at 286.
122. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
123. Id. at 597-98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 6 (statement of Gregory G. Garre, Partner, Latham &
Watkins LLP). But see id. at 103 (statement of Professor Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Profes-
sor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School). Professor Burbank
refers to decisions rejecting a pure application of Conley as "lawless" and analogizes them to the
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allegations deemed "conclusory" and required that the plaintiff plead par-
ticular facts supporting his claim, even on the often difficult-to-prove
question of a defendant's intent.' It is not surprising that allegations of anti-
trust conspiracy and civil rights violations, the two actions at issue in
Twombly and Iqbal respectively, were two of the most common types of
cases in which courts demanded greater specificity from plaintiffs in the
pre-Twombly era. Because courts before Twombly demanded greater speci-
ficity for claims alleging illegal intent, the decision is likely to have a less
disruptive impact on other types of claims for which facts are more easily
available preceding discovery.
Taken together, Warth, Associated General Contractors, Papasan,
Crawfold-El, and their lower court adherents represent the general approach
of the federal courts to pleading even when Conley still reigned. In this
scheme, "conclusory" allegations were rejected, complex causes of action
required the plaintiff to plead sufficient factual matter to create at least a
reasonable belief that the plaintiff could prove his claims, and district courts
were especially cautious in their review of pleadings where discovery might
create significant costs or burdens for defendants.
And while it is undoubtedly true that the Supreme Court rejected calls
for a "heightened pleading standard" in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Nar-
cotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit'2 and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., those decisions are not in conflict with Twombly and Iqbal.
Leatherman rejected the adoption of an explicitly higher pleading standard
than called for by the Federal Rules and Swierkewicz refused to require the
plaintiff to plead, in his complaint, all the evidence that would be needed to
sustain his claim at trial. Those decisions prohibited the creation of pleading
barriers that exceed the "show" requirement of Rule 8(a)(2), but they do not
prohibit a reviewing court from considering the plausibility of the plaintiff's
legal claims in light of his well-pled facts.
Long before Twombly and Iqbal, and contrary to the insistence of those
decisions' critics, federal courts have been in the business of applying a
pleading standard that bears a strong resemblance to the Iqbal working prin-
ciples.
behavior of a "serially wayward child." However, he makes no mention of the various Supreme
Court cases cited supra that rejected Conley's literal language.
125. Marcus, supra note 22, at 448-51, 463-64 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1976)).
126. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
127. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
128. Twombly explicitly rejected the notion that it created a "heightened pleading standard"
and cited both Leatherman and Swierkewicz approvingly. Bell At]. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
569 n.14 (2007).
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B. Iqbal Has Not Resulted in a Significant Increase in
Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissals
More than a year after Iqbal was announced, the decision has not im-
posed the "insurmountable barrier to access" 29 to the courts that was
predicted by some critics. 30 Citations to Iqbal and Twombly abound'' but
this shows nothing about the number of cases actually being dismissed.
Even more importantly, frequency of citation does not show how many
cases have been dismissed under Iqbal that would otherwise have survived
under Conley. Thus far, federal courts have differed in their assessment of
the long-term significance of Iqbal, but evidence to date suggests that the
decision's overall impact has been limited.'
Various courts have stated that the "liberal" spirit of Rule 8(a)(2) re-
mains in effect after Iqbal.'3 According to the Eighth Circuit, "Twombly and
Iqbal did not change [the] fundamental tenet of Rule 12(b)(6) practice" that
in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, "inferences are to be drawn in
favor of the non-moving party." 3 Judge Merritt of the Sixth Circuit has
stated that the Supreme Court has "started to modify somewhat, but not
drastically, the notice pleading rules," but "is not making a major change in
the law of pleading with Twombly and its progeny."36 One district court
judge found nothing remarkable about Iqbal's requirement that courts reject
complaints which "essentially [do] no more than [restate] the elements of
the statute," noting that allowing such a complaint to proceed would violate
"long-standing principles of federal jurisprudence."'
Other judges have used the Iqbal framework to grant motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim but have noted that the complaints would have
129. Spencer, supra note 18, at 28.
130. Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman to Civil Rules Committee and Standing Rules
Committee 2 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Kuperman Memorandum], available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal-memo_.072610.pdf. This memo is a
survey of all federal cases after Iqbal that have applied it in a substantive way. Each of the cases
discussed in this section is reviewed in the Kuperman Memorandum.
131. Id. at I n.2 (indicating that as of July 26, 2010, Iqbal has been cited more than 11,000
times in caselaw alone).
132. Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 194 (statement of Gregory G. Garre, Partner, Latham
& Watkins LLP).
133. Kuperman Memorandum, supra note 130, at 2. But see Hatamyar, supra note 25
(concluding that Iqbal produced a short-term increase in dismissal rates during its first three months
in effect). For reasons why Professor Hatamyar's data is not likely to reflect long-term trends, see
text accompanying notes 160-161.
134. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Innovative
Mktg., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (D. Md. 2009).
135. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F3d 585, 595 (8th Cir. 2009).
136. Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 583 F.3d 896, 911-12 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
137. Garczynski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F Supp. 2d 505, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
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been insufficient even before Twombly. 3 ' For example, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging that the defendants defrauded
the plaintiff by failing to disclose their company's ensuing bankruptcy when
negotiating the plaintiff's termination agreement.'" Judge Posner, writing
for the majority, concluded that the company's dire financial situation was
obvious to all the parties and that the defendant's failure to mention the
bankruptcy in negotiations was more likely an innocent omission than a de-
liberate attempt to defraud the plaintiff.'4 Although the opinion appeared to
engage in something like a plausibility analysis, the court treated Iqbal as
insignificant because the plaintiff's arguments themselves showed that his
case had no merit. Accordingly, dismissal was justified under any reasonable
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2).141 Similarly, in Cooney v. Rossiter,4 4 another
panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging
that the trial judge conspired with child welfare officials to take away the
plaintiff's custody of her minor son.143 The court noted that the complaint
contained nothing but "a bare conclusion" of conspiracy that would not have
been sufficient even pre-Twombly.'"
The most detailed review of Iqbal's effects thus far supports these
judges' understanding of Iqbal as having a relatively limited impact.'45 Al-
though members of Congress have worried that Iqbal will lead to
significantly more cases being dismissed,'" an ongoing comprehensive sur-
vey of cases applying Iqbal concludes that "the case law to date does not
appear to indicate that Iqbal has dramatically chan ed the application of the
standards used to determine pleading sufficiency." 4 Judge Mark Kravitz,148
Chair of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, agrees
that judges have taken a "fairly nuanced" response to Iqbal and that the de-
cision is not "a blockbuster that gets rid of any case that is filed." 49
Testimony in congressional hearings indicates that federal courts have used
the Iqbal framework in recent months to deny motions to dismiss for failure
138. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336,
339-40 (7th Cir. 2009).
139. Duffey, 576 F.3d at 339-40.
140. Id. at 338.
141. Id. at 340.
142. 583 F.3d 967.
143. Id. at 971-72.
144. Id. at 971.
145. Kuperman Memorandum, supra note 130, at 2.
146. See supra Section I.D.
147. Kuperman Memorandum, supra note 130, at 2; see also Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much
Ado About Twombly?: A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6)
Motions, 83 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1811, 1835-38 (2008).
148. Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.
149. Tony Mauro, Plaintiffs Groups Mount Effort to Undo Supreme Court's "Iqbal" Ruling,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202433931370.
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to state a claim in dozens of cases, including pro se complaints and claims
based on deprivation of constitutional or civil rights.'5
On the other hand, some judges view Twombly and Iqbal as much more
of a sea change than a mere clarification of a long-existing standard. Panels
from various circuits have indicated that Twombly and Iqbal represent a
"significant change, with broad-reaching implications,"s' and have marked
the two decisions as instituting a "heightened"'52 or "stricter" 5 1 pleading
standard. One district court judge has called Iqbal a "striking retreat from
the highly permissible pleading standards often thought to distinguish the
federal system from 'the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior
era.' "' In a very small number of cases, judges have granted motions to
dismiss while noting that the now-insufficient complaint would have likely
survived pre-Twombly.
Critics of Iqbal point to their own data as evidence of the decision's sig-
nificant impact. For example, a recent empirical study by Professor
Hatamyar suggests that Iqbal has produced an observable increase in the
number of cases dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), particularly for civil rights
claims.5 6 The study reviews approximately 1,000 Rule 12(b)(6) motions
decided in federal district court beginning 2 years prior to Twombly and end-
ing 3 months after Iqbal.'17 It concludes that Iqbal has resulted in a
"statistically significant" increase in the number of cases dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6), with the increase potentially as high as 10% of all filed
150. Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 196-98 (statement of Gregory G. Garre, Partner,
Latham & Watkins LLP) (citing cases).
151. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009).
152. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Courie v. Alcoa
Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009). The Fowler court further concluded that
Twombly has overruled Swierkiewicz and undermined the sufficiency of the model causes of action,
or "forms," provided as a supplement to the Federal Rules. 578 F.3d at 211. These forms are limited
in their factual content and were designed to demonstrate the simplicity of federal pleading.
153. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 262 (4th Cir. 2009)
(Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154. Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-245, 2009 WL 2424608,
at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)).
155. E.g., Coleman v. Tulsa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 08-CV-0081, 2009 WL 2513520, at
*3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2009); Ansley v. Florida, Dep't of Revenue, No. 4:09cvl61, 2009 WL
1973548, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 8, 2009).
156. See Hatamyar, supra note 25, at 608. Some members of Congress have expressed con-
cern about a disparate impact on civil rights cases. See December House Hearing, supra note 17, at
*6 (statement of Rep. Conyers, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[Tihere will be a number of
civil rights and civil liberties cases that could be negatively affected [by Iqbal].").
157. Of the 1,039 total motions reviewed, only 173 were decided post-Iqbal. Hatamyar, supra
note 25, at 585.
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motions.' The data also indicate that pro se complaints have been dis-
missed at an increased rate as large as 15%."
However, as Professor Hatamyar notes, the usefulness of her study as a
predictor of Iqbal's long-term impact is limited given the small number of
post-Iqbal motions reviewed (173) and the fact that all the cases were de-
cided within three months of the Iqbal ruling.'6 A significant increase in
dismissal rates immediately after Iqbal is consistent with the rhetorical
splash caused by the decision, as well as with judges' unfamiliarity with
applying the working principles, but will not necessarily reflect Iqbal's
long-term effects. Iqbal sent a message to the federal courts to revise their
practices for deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions, but it will take some time for
the courts to settle on a consistent application of the decision's analytical
framework.
It is also important to note that Professor Hatamyar's study shows that
many more cases dismissed under Iqbal are dismissed with leave to
amend.1' Although there are no available data that conclusively show what
percentage of cases dismissed with leave to amend are successfully re-
filed,162 the fact that more cases are dismissed under Iqbal with leave to
amend supports Judge Kravitz's view that judges are resisting a dramatic
change in applying Iqbal.'63
C. Iqbal Is Not Likely to Significantly Increase Dismissal
Rates in the Foreseeable Future
The cases reviewed above suggest that, by and large, federal courts are
not dismissing significantly more cases following Iqbal. Although the deci-
sion's permanent effects will only be revealed over time, there are several
reasons to think this trend of limited impact will continue for the foreseeable
future. First, judges' hesitancy to use the Iqbal framework to grant signifi-
cantly more Rule 12(b)(6) motions is plausibly explained by the enduring
legacy of the Conley rule. Even though the pure Conley standard was not
used in practice, Conley's commitment to notice pleading served as the
158. Id. at 601 (noting that under Iqbal, approximately 56 percent of all Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tions were granted either with or without leave to amend, as compared to 46 percent under Conley).
159. Id. at 615 (noting that under Iqbal, approximately 85 percent of Rule 12(b)(6) motions
on pro se complaints were granted either with or without leave to amend, as compared to 67 percent
under Conley).
160. Id. at 585.
161. Id. at 598-99 (showing that while only 6 percent of cases dismissed under Conley were
dismissed with leave to amend, 19 percent of cases dismissed under Iqbal were dismissed with leave
to amend). When a case is dismissed with leave to amend, the plaintiff is allowed to correct the
deficiencies in the complaint and refile it. In contrast, where dismissal is without leave to amend, the
plaintiff is prohibited from refiling the case and it is effectively permanently terminated. Thus,
whether leave to amend is granted makes a significant difference to a plaintiff.
162. Id. at 600.
163. Id. ("[The] newness of the Iqbal standard caused [district judges] to err on the side of
allowing the plaintiff one more chance to plead.").
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dominant pleading rhetoric for fifty years. Judges are unlikely to dismiss
significantly more cases for failure to state a claim under Twombly and Iqbal
when the requirement of a "short and plain statement" remains the rule and
the Supreme Court has specifically denied that Twombly heightened the sub-
stantive pleading standard. Instead, judges are more likely to read
"plausibility" as imposing something like a requirement that a complaint's
well-pled facts "reasonably" show a claim to relief.'6
Of course, the reasonableness of a legal theory in light of the facts al-
leged is a subjective judgment that will vary from judge to judge and case to
case, but so will any Rule 12(b)(6) standard that calls for the trial judge to
evaluate whether a complaint "shows" likely merit at the pleading stage.
Plaintiffs should expect that the factual support required to make their
claims plausible will vary depending on the complexity and novelty of the
claim. In particular, more facts will be required when there is an obvious
alternative legal explanation for the defendant's behavior.
A further reason to think that Iqbal will not lead to a significant increase
in dismissal rates is the fact that only a small minority of plaintiffs genu-
inely lack sufficient facts to plead their claim with plausibility when filing a
complaint. For the majority of plaintiffs, Iqbal merely requires that counsel
include more facts in the complaint-facts which counsel already has in his
possession at the time of filing.'6 One might object that this requirement
will increase plaintiffs' initial litigation costs and shift the primary focus of
litigation from summary judgment to the pleading stage. However, such
concerns do not appear to have overly burdened plaintiffs thus far. In a re-
cent survey of plaintiffs' attorneys practicing employment discrimination
law (claims in which clients often face "information asymmetries" at the
pleading stage 6), fewer than 15 percent of those surveyed indicated that
they conduct more investigation prior to filing a complaint, screen cases
more carefully, or raise different claims than they would have prior to
164. See Tymoczko, supra note 110, at 536.
165. Id. at 536-37 (arguing that judges will consider several factors to determine the reason-
ableness of a complaint's legal theory, including expectations about how the world works, the
breadth of legal behavior described by the plaintiff's allegations, the amount and type of facts in the
complaint, the plausibility of competing inferences, and the substantive legal context in which the
claim is brought).
166. See EMERY G. LEE Il & THOMAS E. WILLGING, ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON CIVIL RULES 12 (2010) (reporting that while 70.1 percent of surveyed plaintiffs' attorneys
indicated Iqbal has changed the way they practice, 94.2 percent of that group indicated that, after
Iqbal, they include more facts in the complaint).
167. See Suja A. Thomas, Pondering Iqbal: The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion
to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 15 (2010) (arguing that the plau-
sibility analysis of Twombly and Iqbal has effectively transformed the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment).
168. For criticism of Twombly as ignoring such information asymmetries between plaintiffs
and defendants, see Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217,
1261 (2008).
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Twombly and Iqbal.'6 Where information asymmetries truly prevent the
plaintiff from accessing facts necessary to plead his claim with plausibility,
the courts are likely to conduct the plausibility analysis less rigorously.o
Indeed, mere weeks after announcing the plausibility standard, the Supreme
Court allowed a complaint to survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where the
complaint pled all the facts the plaintiff could reasonably have been ex-
pected to know before discovery and stated a valid legal theory.
Two final factors support the contention that Iqbal will not lead to a sig-
nificant increase in dismissal rates. First, the Supreme Court has explicitly
held that pro se complaints are to be "held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."72 The Court effectively held that
those complaints that are most likely to be burdened by a more rigorous re-
view of a pleading's plausibility should not face an insurmountable barrier
at the pleading stage."' Second, recent amendments to the Federal Rules
have expanded a plaintiff's right to amend his complaint as a matter of
course.174 These amendments should ensure that many of those plaintiffs
who find their complaints dismissed for failure to state a claim will be able
to revise their pleadings, develop their factual content, and continue pursu-
ing their claims.
169. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 166, at 12. These results also suggest that a long-term
chilling effect, whereby plaintiffs with valid claims would be dissuaded from bringing suit, is un-
likely. One of the primary advantages of Twombly and Iqbal is that, as the courts gain more
experience applying them, the appropriate parameters of federal pleading will be clearer than they
have been at any time since Conley. This increase in clarity will benefit plaintiffs' lawyers as they
advise clients on the merits of potential claims and the decision to pursue litigation.
170. Cf Recent Case: Eleventh Circuit Dismisses Alien Tort Statute Claims Against Coca-
Cola Under Iqbal's Plausibility Pleading Standard, 123 HARV. L. REV. 580, 584-85 (2009) (sug-
gesting that courts should "apply[] the Supreme Court's plausibility standard leniently" in cases
where defendants are "much better positioned than plaintiffs to provide facts crucial to resolving"
the suit; otherwise it might become "practically infeasible" to bring such cases).
171. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). The Court reversed the dismissal of a prisoner-
plaintiff's pro se complaint alleging that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of his Eighth Amend-
ment rights by "demonstrating deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs." Id. at 90. The
complaint alleged only that the plaintiff had a hepatitis C-related illness which required a special
treatment program, that prison officials terminated his treatment on the basis of their suspicion that
plaintiff intended to use illegal narcotics, and that as a result, he faced the "imminent" risk of "fur-
therance of [his] disease' "irreversible damage to [his] liver[,] and possible death." Id. at 89-91
(second alteration in original). Citing Twombly, the Court held that these limited factual allegations
were "enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)." Id. at 93.
172. Id. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Applying this standard,
the Supreme Court approved the complaint in Erickson despite its limited factual content.
173. But see Hatamyar, supra note 25, at 614 (noting a significant increase in the number of
pro se complaints that are dismissed under Iqbal compared to those dismissed under Conley).
174. Under Rule 15(a), as amended on December 1, 2009, a plaintiff is entitled to amend his
pleading as a matter of course up to twenty-one days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e),
or (f), provided the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required. FED. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(B). This amendment was designed to allow the plaintiff to amend his pleading, where he
deems appropriate, in order to meet the arguments in the Rule 12 motion. The advisory committee
recognized that such amendments may eliminate the need to decide the Rule 12 motion or reduce
the number of issues to be decided. Id. advisory committee's note.
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Although some courts have claimed that the importance of Iqbal "cannot
be minimalized,"',7 that is only true for those who care deeply about the me-
chanical procedures that judges use to decide Rule 12(b)(6) motions. If, as is
likely the case for most members of Congress, the only real concern is with
the ultimate judgments that courts reach, then the real impact of Iqbal is in
fact limited. It is unwise at this early stage for critics to denounce the deci-
sion as guaranteed to dramatically increase the rate of dismissal of claims in
federal court when evidence from the case law is inconclusive or to the con-
trary.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD REJECT LEGISLATION OVERRULING
TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
Congress should not respond to Twombly and Iqbal with a sweeping re-
versal. The Rules Enabling Act delegates responsibility for creating the
Federal Rules to the Supreme Court in the first instance, 116 and both Twom-
bly and Iqbal show that a majority of the Court is concerned about the costs
and burdens of discovery in modern federal litigation.177 Iqbal exemplifies
the Supreme Court's view that the pleading system should strike the right
balance between the plaintiff's need for access to the courts and the defen-
dant's desire to avoid discovery obligations early in litigation.
Congress has a role to play in setting the Federal Rules that govern access to
the federal court system, but its response to the Iqbal decision, if any, should
be both tailored to and considerate of the Court's concerns. In particular,
Congress should reject both pieces of currently proposed legislation in order
to avoid imposing an inflexible and unworkable standard on federal judges
or injecting further ambiguity into the pleading standard.
As mentioned previously, the two existing congressional bills con-
struct different legislative responses to Twombly and Iqbal. House Bill 4115
takes the more forceful approach and explicitly legislates a pleading stan-
dard by adopting the language of Conley, including the "no set of facts"
rule, but does not mention Conley or the Supreme Court. In contrast, Sen-
ate Bill 1504 sets the pleading standard by reference to the "standards set
forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson."o In
doing so, the Senate bill acknowledges a role for the Supreme Court in in-
terpreting Rule 8(a)(2) and at least arguably authorizes federal courts to rely
on other pre-Twombly precedents that dismissed complaints even when Con-
ley reigned. Statements of the Senate bill's proponents indicate that it is
175. FTC v. Innovative Mktg., Inc., 654 F Supp. 2d 378, 384 n.2 (D. Md. 2009).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
177. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 558-59 (2007).
178. See supra Section I.D.2.
179. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
180. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
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designed merely to restore the state of affairs that existed immediately be-
fore Twombly.'"' And while supporters of the House bill also claim to want
to "restore the notice pleading standard that existed prior to Ashcroft v. Iq-
bal,"'" the text of that bill would in fact do much more. By explicitly setting
the standard using the most liberal language from Conley, House Bill 4115
would go well beyond the pleading standard that existed in practice before
Twombly. Although these two proposed legislative approaches would pro-
duce significantly different results if enacted, this Note argues that neither
approach is desirable or acceptable.
A. House Bill 4115 Is Inconsistent with Rule 8(a) and Supreme
Court Precedent, and Would Imbalance the
Benefits and Burdens of Discovery
If House Bill 4115 is enacted, federal courts will be required to reject
any expositions of Rule 8(a)(2) other than those that specifically cite to the
"no set of facts" language in Conley. In doing so, House Bill 4115 would
depart from decades of federal precedent and strike an inappropriate balance
between the benefits and burdens of discovery to modem litigants.
A faithful application of the House bill's "no set of facts" language,
which is extremely generous for plaintiffs, would overwhelm the federal
court system by imposing virtually no pleading requirements whatsoever.
The bill would eliminate Rule 12(b)(6) as an effective tool for the early dis-
posal of suits lacking any plausible merit. For example, the complaint in
Cooney v. Rossiter, alleging a conspiracy between court-appointed officers
but lacking any facts whatsoever to support that allegation, could not be
dismissed under the House bill standard because the district court could not
ex ante rule out the possibility that facts might later be introduced to support
the claim. I
Without Rule 12(b)(6) as a screening mechanism, plaintiffs would ac-
quire access to discovery in virtually every case and would be able to
impose significant costs in both time and resources on public and private
defendants. The Federal Rules have never required the plaintiff to do so lit-
tle. Since its inception, Rule 8(a)(2) has required the plaintiff to both
provide the defendant with notice of the plaintiff's claim and "show" that
the claimant is entitled to relief." House Bill 4115 would essentially evis-
cerate the second half of Rule 8(a)(2) and institute a new pleading standard
that is much too favorable to plaintiffs and inconsistent with the balance
struck by the Federal Rules as written.
181. 111 CONG. REc. S7890 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter) (stating that
the intention of the Senate bill is to "restore the system of notice pleadings that has served our Fed-
eral judicial system well since 1938").
182. December House Hearing, supra note 17, at *9 (statement of Rep. Nadler, Member, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
183. 583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2009). Cooney is reviewed supra Section II.B.
184. FED. R. Cv. P. 8(a)(2).
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Federal courts in practice have never adhered strictly to the Conley lan-
guage to decide Rule 12(b)(6) motions, 8 notwithstanding the statements of
supporters of House Bill 4115 to the contrary. Decisions from Warth to Iq-
bal requiring more developed pleading reflect the federal courts' effort to
chip away at the Conley standard, especially in light of growing concerns
about litigation abuse. Pre-Twombly cases insisting on more from plaintiffs'
pleadings reflected a judgment that the literal terms of Conley were neither
desirable nor workable, a judgment to which Twombly and Iqbal are heirs.
Yet House Bill 4115 would force the federal courts to employ just such an
unprecedented generous pleading standard, one that raises serious concerns
for the administrability of federal pleading and that ignores wholesale the
Supreme Court's legitimate concerns about the integrity of the federal litiga-
tion system.
The disagreement between a majority of the Supreme Court and those
favoring House Bill 4115 consists primarily of a policy judgment about the
most desirable structure of federal litigation. Although both Conley and Iq-
bal claimed fidelity to Rule 8(a)(2), those decisions represent different
visions of what meaningful access to the courts should look like. Thus far,
both before and after Twombly, a vision of pleading that interprets the Fed-
eral Rules as requiring some notion of plausibility has prevailed. This vision
aims to minimize litigation abuse and preserve the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as
a valuable tool for the early elimination of meritless claims. House Bill 4115
should be rejected because it would undo this balance and replace it with a
framework that the federal courts have repeatedly rejected as unmanageable
in practice.
B. Senate Bill 1504 Would Create Ambiguity in the Pleading Standard
and Produce Conflicting Sources of Legal Authority
Although Senate Bill 1504 takes a less drastic approach to overruling
Twombly and Iqbal, this bill should also be rejected. Even if the legislation's
only purpose is to return to the federal pleading practice that existed pre-
2007 and it would sanction pre-Twombly cases that adopted "notice-plus
pleading,"'86 the Senate bill nevertheless suffers from several critical flaws.
First, the text of Senate Bill 1504 is incompatible with the notice-plus
pleading cases that came before Twombly. The text references Conley, and
only Conley, as the appropriate authority to decide Rule 12(b)(6) motions,
and judges will be expected to apply the statute's plain meaning. Twombly
recognized the problem of federal courts citing Conley for a standard that
many of them did not employ in practice,' 7 and it corrected the problem by
resolving the ambiguity and announcing a new interpretation that it fully
intends to apply in all future Rule 12(b)(6) motions. If Senate Bill 1504's
185. See supra Section II.A.
186. For the origin of this phrase, see Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007).
187. Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007).
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supporters expect judges to retain their pre-Twombly practice of dismissing
complaints with excessively vague or conclusory allegations, it is irrespon-
sible lawmaking for Congress to set the pleading standard by reference to a
decision that emphasizes notice as the only function of a complaint.
Second, expecting the federal courts to apply the pre-Twombly notice-
plus pleading standard in the face of a statute supporting Conley's notice-
only rhetoric would create conflicting sources of legal authority. A judicial
interpretation of a Federal Rule can be modified or clarified in subsequent
cases, but when Congress uses specific legislation to control the interpreta-
tion of a rule, the courts are bound to respect the statute.' Senate Bill 1504
would specifically control the courts' interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) by re-
quiring that Rule 12(b)(6) motions be decided under the Conley standard.
When Congress passes a statute with a strict command in the text, the courts
must honor that text and give effect to that strict rule even if Congress would
actually prefer to see the statute applied in a less rigorous way (as Congress
arguably intends for Senate Bill 1504). Therefore, the Senate bill would
prohibit courts from rejecting complaints presenting mere conclusory alle-
gations or lacking critical factual allegations even if Congress would
actually prefer to see them do so.
It might be argued that we have little to fear from this apparent conflict
of authority in light of the Supreme Court's fifty years of pleading jurispru-
dence in which its rhetoric (notice pleading) did not match is practice
(notice-plus pleading). Since courts adopted a strongly liberal rhetoric in
Conley but then applied a more rigorous standard in practice, one might
wonder why they cannot make a similarly rigorous application of the strong-
ly liberal rhetoric in Senate Bill 1504. But this argument overlooks the
respect that the Supreme Court owes to a congressional statute as opposed
to language, especially dicta, in one of its own opinions.
Whereas the Court has always been in the business of interpreting stat-
utes and then distinguishing and clarifying its interpretation in subsequent
cases, resistance to an implementation of the language of Senate Bill 1504
would amount to judicial disrespect of a law passed by the legislative
branch. Other than a proper respect for stare decisis, nothing prevented the
Supreme Court from backing away from a strict application of its Conley
decision in future cases-as it did in Papasan and Crawford-El-or from
wholly repudiating parts of Conley as unclear and ill-advised-as it did in
Twombly. And once the Supreme Court expressed doubt about the correct-
ness of a pure application of Conley, lower courts in turn gained more
flexibility in their ability to interpret Rule 8(a)(2). Because Conley's inter-
pretation of Rule 8(a)(2) was announced by the Supreme Court, the Court
retained discretion to modify that interpretation when experience showed
such modification to be necessary.
188. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2007). The
Court in Tellabs noted that Congress used the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to
enact "exacting pleading requirements" on those bringing private securities fraud claims. The Court
then proceeded to determine the meaning of the statute's requirement that a plaintiff state facts
giving rise to a "strong inference" of fraudulent intent.
440 [Vol. 109:415
Pleading with Congress
But the Court would have no such flexibility in interpretation if the Sen-
ate bill became law. That bill's interpretation of the rule would be binding
and the Court would be obligated to apply it faithfully to all Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. Senate Bill 1504 would then leave the precedential effect of several
Supreme Court decisions that claim to apply Conley in doubt. For instance,
decisions like Associated General Contractors, Papasan, and Crawford-El
all purported to follow Conley but rejected conclusory allegations and in-
sisted that complaints contain some baseline level of factual sufficiency. If
Congress intends that the courts ignore Twombly and Iqbal but preserve
these other decisions and their notice-plus pleading approach, then the
courts will be relegated to using an amorphous body of precedent that car-
ries Conley's strongly plaintiff rhetoric but which applies it unfaithfully.
Senate Bill 1504 would thus deprive the courts of Iqbal's useful analytical
framework for evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) motions and would restore the am-
biguous pleading practice that existed pre-Twombly.
Another problem with the Senate bill is that, if applied as Congress ap-
pears to intend, it cannot achieve its goal of restoring the pre-Twombly
practice. The majorities in both Twombly and Iqbal viewed those cases as
clarifying prior precedents interpreting plausibility as a requirement of Rule
8(a)(2) as written.189 If Rule 8(a)(2) still provides the substantive pleading
standard after Senate Bill 1504, then judges will still need to evaluate the
very same "show that the pleader is entitled to relief' requirement that was
at issue in Twombly. That case, like many decisions before it, read the rule's
language to require a baseline showing of the plausibility of a claimant's
allegations. Because the courts indicated long before Twombly that Rule
8(a)(2) prohibits complaints with mere conclusory allegations, passing Sen-
ate Bill 1504 with a view toward the time just before Twombly would create
virtually the same pleading standard that is currently in place under Iqbal.
Finally, we should not desire a return to the uncertainty of the pre-
Twombly pleading jurisprudence. Pleading requirements immediately before
Twombly may have appeared stable,'" but in fact the courts operated in
something of a procedural twilight zone. Supreme Court cases like Papasan
and Crawford-El, along with similar decisions in the lower courts, professed
adherence to Conley's nondiscretionary rule but nevertheless asked judges to
evaluate complaints under a stricter framework. The result was a pleading
doctrine whose rule in theory was forgiving and made virtually no allow-
ance for judicial discretion (Conley), but which was applied in practice
much more strictly and in a largely discretionary manner. Twombly put an
end to the charade by asking courts to do openly what they had been doing
in practice all along.
189. The majorities in Twombly and Iqbal made these claims notwithstanding the dissenters'
accusation that the Court rewrote the Federal Rules with their decisions.
190. This stability was likely the result of judges' and counsels' familiarity with Conley. Both
judges and litigants repeatedly cited Conley as the ostensible rule, but all understood that the actual
process of deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions would involve at least some subjective evaluation of the
plausibility of the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint. On the other hand, it is likely that before
Twombly, judges were more likely to find the complaint to be sufficient in close cases.
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A critic might respond that Iqbal's moderate impact on federal pleading
practice, as shown in Section II.B, proves that it has done less to resolve the
pleading tension than might be supposed. After all, if Iqbal requires a more
searching review of complaints than did Conley, but Iqbal is not resulting in
significantly more dismissals, then perhaps the tension in pleading doctrine
is still with us.
The answer to such a criticism lies in Iqbal's approval of judges' subjec-
tive decision making in their review of pleadings. Prior to Twombly, the
pleading system professed to have an objective pleading standard but it was
applied by judges in a discretionary manner. After Iqbal, the system now
calls for reviewing judges to subjectively evaluate complaints to determine
the plausibility of the claims. Twombly and Iqbal thus reflect the Supreme
Court's view that the rhetoric of the pleading system should match the real-
ity. Put another way, the Court is interested in having judges conduct
subjective evaluations of a complaint's plausibility more openly and more
consistently.192 The Court believes that judges have been making such de-
terminations all along and it views the evaluation of plausibility as called for
by the text of Rule 8(a)(2).
If Congress wishes to sanction the discretion used in practice by pre-
Twombly courts, then Congress should favor Twombly's subjective rule both
for its openness and for its policy. But Senate Bill 1504 would instead return
the pleading system to the twilight zone by mandating an objective standard
in theory that Congress knows will be applied less strictly and with greater
discretion in practice. Of course, the more likely explanation is that support-
ers of Senate Bill 1504 do not at all approve of the subjective determinations
that judges used to evaluate pleadings pre-Twombly. Indeed, supporters of
the bill have indicated that a primary goal is to eliminate judicial discretion
in evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. 9 Far from expressing desire for
the discretionary approach of pre-Twombly courts, the bill's supporters wish
to implement once and for all the objective pleading framework espoused in
Conley. But for exactly the reasons stated below with respect to the House
bill, this vision of pleading is unworkable and indeterminate.
C. Congress Should Resist the Urge to React
Hastily to Twombly and Iqbal
Given that pure notice pleading never applied in practice from 1957 to
2007 and that complaints were routinely dismissed as stating mere "conclu-
sory" allegations, one wonders why Iqbal's critics consider that period the
191. See supra Section H.A.
192. But see Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 103 (statement of Professor Stephen B. Bur-
bank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law
School) (rejecting the desirability of having federal courts "do openly what they were doing even
under Conley" as an "ex post blessing of lawless behavior").
193. Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 172 (statement of Sen. Feingold, Member, S. Judiciary
Comm.).
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golden years of pleading. After all, given the justification for the dismissals
of complaints in decisions like Associated General Contractors, Papasan,
and Crawford-El, it is curious that we have only now seen declarations of
crisis from Congress and spirited efforts to pass legislation in the name of
preserving access to the courts.
The most likely explanation is that Twombly and Iqbal created a rhetori-
cal splash by upsetting Conley's place as the "official" interpretation of Rule
8(a)(2). Justice Souter's opinion for the majority in Twombly did not con-
sider the retirement of Conley's most liberal language to be particularly
noteworthy. Instead, he pointed out that the standard "puzzl[ed] the profes-
sion for 50 years" and led to inconsistent results.'" Justice Souter likely
believed that Twombly would clarify the often-used federal pleading stan-
dard, but almost certainly did not expect that it would lead to a significant
increase in the number of cases dismissed for failure to state a claim. Even
as he dissented in Iqbal, Justice Souter maintained adherence to the working
principles of the new analytical framework; he merely disagreed with the
majority on the plausibility of the complaint's factual allegations. 95 Never-
theless, despite Justice Souter's attempt to do little more than clarify federal
pleading practice, his unceremonious retirement of the Conley standard has
caught the attention of Congress and led to imprudent calls for a sweeping
legislative response.
A primary reason that Congress should resist the urge to legislate at all
without a better understanding of Iqbal's effects is a proper respect for the
Rules Enabling Act. Critics of Twombly and Iqbal may have decried the Su-
preme Court for using those decisions to surreptitiously amend the Federal
Rules,9 but such accusations cannot justify Congress itself in ignoring the
Rules Enabling Act and setting out the pleading standard all on its own.1
The Rules Enabling Act is a particularly useful way to create the Federal
Rules because it benefits from the collaborative expertise of legislators, Su-
preme Court Justices, lower-court judges, scholars, and legal professionals.
The system is designed so that those who deal with the Federal Rules every
day give them shape and only then does Congress give those rules the force
of law. But Congress is not well-suited to legislate a pleading standard on its
own without the advice of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee or the
Supreme Court.'"
194. Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007).
195. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959-60 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
196. See supra notes 90,98-100 and accompanying text.
197. But see Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 104 (statement of Professor Stephen B. Bur-
bank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law
School) (arguing that the appropriate response is to temporarily restore the pre-Twombly standard
and then direct the Rules Advisory Committee to address the issue).
198. Cf Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REv. 873, 876-77 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court is in a poor position to make
choices about pleading practice in individual cases). The Federal Rules Advisory Committee has not
yet taken a position on Twombly or Iqbal.
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Several other factors also counsel against an aggressive legislative re-
sponse. First, the Justices who decided Conley could not have foreseen the
burdens that modem discovery poses for defendants. In light of such devel-
opments, notice pleading may well have run its course as an appropriate
pleading standard.'" In addition, the recent expansion of the right to
amendment as a matter of course should increase the opportunity of plain-
tiffs with valid claims to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Finally, the class of plaintiffs for whom Twombly and Iqbal will make a
meaningful difference in access to the federal courts is small. While there
are many types of plaintiffs who require access to discovery in order to
prove their claims,2" it is a substantially smaller class who lack sufficient
factual information at the time of filing to plead their claims with plausibil-
ity. For the majority of plaintiffs who can, without substantial effort,
produce facts at the pleading stage to show that their claim is at least plausi-
ble, Twombly does little more than require that they do so. Only those
plaintiffs who genuinely lack the ability to plead such facts at the outset are
likely to suffer at the hands of Twombly's plausibility standard.20 1 A modifi-
cation of the Federal Rules may be appropriate to ensure that the minority of
plaintiffs in this latter category do not lose their opportunity to have their
claim heard. Alternatively, perhaps notice pleading should be retained but
access to discovery modified by amending other rules. Either way, Congress
should not react hastily before the effects of the Supreme Court's reinterpre-
tation of Rule 8(a)(2) in Twombly and Iqbal have become apparent.2 02
If there is to be a legislative response to the Supreme Court's pleading
decisions, it should be the product of the deliberate process called for by the
Rules Enabling Act in which rule changes end in Congress, but do not begin
there. The Rules Advisory Committee is currently studying the effects of
Iqbal and will soon be well-positioned to recommend solutions to meet the
concerns of defendants while still preserving meaningful access to the
courts for plaintiffs.203 Achieving the proper balance of access to federal
courts is a policy choice and there is no doubt that Congress has a role to
play. But Congress should not make that choice on its own before careful
199. For a discussion about balancing interests in a modem pleading system, see Spencer,
supra note 18, at 26-31. See also Mark Hermann et al., Plausible Denial: Should Congress Over-
rule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 141, 143-47 (2009).
200. See, e.g., December House Hearings, supra note 17, at *2 (statement of Rep. Hank John-
son, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy) ("In discrimination cases . . . it is
frequently only through the discovery process that plaintiffs are able to identify non-public informa-
tion that would support their claims."); Mauro, supra note 149.
201. Lonny Hoffman has characterized plaintiffs in such cases as facing "information asym-
metries." See Hoffman, supra note 168, at 1261. Members of Congress have not expressed any
substantial opposition to Twombly and Iqbal based specifically on a desire to protect this category of
plaintiffs.
202. But see Hermann et al., supra note 199, at 153 (statement of Professor Stephen B. Bur-
bank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law
School) (arguing that legislation is immediately necessary to undo Iqbal, which should only then be
followed by "thoughtful and deliberate" consideration of the need for changes to the Federal Rules).
203. See Kuperman Memorandum, supra note 130, at 1.
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consideration of the opinions of those in the best position to offer sound
advice.
CONCLUSION
At bottom, pleading standards are about access to justice. The debate
over finding the right balance between the interests of plaintiffs in litigating
their claims versus those of defendants who would be haled into court with-
out any showing of wrongdoing is far from over. Congress, like the Supreme
Court, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, the scholarly community,
and the public, has a strong interest in this issue and a role to play in devel-
oping solutions to evolving challenges. The difficulties of modem pleading
practice did not begin with Twombly and they will not end with Iqbal. How-
ever, because Iqbal has not resulted in a significant increase in the number
of cases dismissed for failure to state a claim, a hasty legislative response is
not appropriate. The problems this Note highlights with recent proposals for
a congressionally legislated pleading standard should caution members of
Congress against a rush to judgment on this complex and important issue.
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